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NOTES
A NEW APPROACH TO RULE 10b-5: DISTINGUISHING
THE CLOSE CORPORATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court reversed the direction of the
federal securities laws. Instead of continuing the long tradition of in-
terpreting these laws "flexibly rather than technically or restrictively,"
1
the Court narrowed their scope.2 This change in judicial thinking was
particularly evident in cases involving the frequently litigated3 rule
lOb-5.4 For example, the Court limited standing under rule lOb-5 to
1. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1975). See, e.g., Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654,
658-59 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (defeated tender offeror
lacks standing under proxy rules); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (deception
required for rule lOb-5 cause of action); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter
required to establish rule lOb-5 violation); Foremost & McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423
U.S. 232 (1976) (initial purchase not counted for § 16(b) liability); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)
(no suit for derivative damages for violation of federal election laws by misuse of corporate
funds); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (for injunctive relief under the Wil-
hams Act, private litigant must show irreparable harm); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shares in a state nonprofit housing cooperative are not "securities");
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only actual purchaser and seller
have standing under rule 1Ob-5).
3. The Supreme Court has declared, "rule lOb-5 may well be the most litigated provision in
the federal securities laws." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). Addition-
ally, the Court has recently characterized rule lOb-5 as a '"judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
One commentator has called the rule the "most potent and the most versatile instrument in the
armament of federal securities regulation." Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5
Corporate Management Cases, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1007, 1007 (1973).
4. The Securities Exchange Commission promulgated rule lOb-5 almost eight years after the
enactment of section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780)
(1976), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
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actual purchasers and sellers of securities5 and has held that allegations
of mere negligence6 or breach of fiduciary duty7 are insufficient to cre-
ate a rule 1Ob-5 cause of action.
While the federal courts restricted rule lOb-5,8 state courts also began
to reassess their approach to another important aspect of corporate
law-the treatment of close corporations within the state legal system.
With increasing readiness state courts9 and legislaturesI ° recognized
that the smaller number of participants in a close corporation,"' the
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Rule lb-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
6. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
7. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
8. In accordance with the present Supreme Court posture, many lower courts have nar-
rowed the scope of rule lOb-5. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Ketchum v.
Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Thomas v.
Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Wright v. Heizner Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), aIrd in part & rei'd in part on other ground, 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
9. "[T]here has been a definite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judicial treatment
of the close corporation as s.uigenerir." Galler v. Galler, 32 II. 2d 16, 28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584
(1965). See also Krueger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 806, 210 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1965) (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
This trend tdward distinct treatment of the close corporation has reached the point where many
courts are now applying separate standards for close corporations. See, e.g., Comolli v. Comolli,
241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, - Mass. -, 353 N.E.2d
657 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Cain v.
Cain, - Mass. App. Ct. -, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975); 68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142
N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), af'd, 150 N.J. Super. 42, 374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div.
1977); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975).
10. Some states have enacted separate subchapters for the close corporation whose shares are
not traded on any organized market. See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 158 (Deering 1977); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 341-356 (1974); MD. CORP. & ASS'N CODE ANN. (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 1371-1386 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); S. C. CODE §§ 12-16.22(c) (Supp. 1975).
11. The size of an enterprise need not be determinative. For example, Ford Motor Co. was a
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lack of an established market for close corporation stock, and the active
role of shareholders in the close corporation, 2 necessitate distinguish-
ing this business organization from the large publicly-held
corporation. 1
3
State courts have been particularly willing to distinguish the close
corporation in the area of the fiduciary duty of corporate managers and
controlling shareholders to the minority shareholders.' 4 Courts have
recognized that the unique characteristics of the close corporation leave
many minority shareholders susceptible to oppressive squeeze-out tech-
niques'5 and thus have required a higher fiduciary duty in the close
corporation context.' 6
Most rule lOb-5 cases involve close corporations.' 7 One would ex-
pect, therefore, that the two recent trends in corporate law, the narrow-
ing of rule lOb-5 and the increasing recognition of the separate status of
the close corporation, would result in a third important develop-
ment--the distinction of close corporations in the application of rule
lOb-5. Courts, however, have limited the ambit of rule lOb-5 without
distinguishing the close corporation from the publicly-held corpora-
close corporation until 1955. See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 1.03 (2d ed. 1971).
12. Most courts and commentators consider these three elements to be crucial in distinguish-
ing the close corporation. See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975). Seegeneraly 1
F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 1.07. For varying definitions of the close corporation, see H.
HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 257 (2d ed. 1970); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note
I1, at § 1.02; Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948).
13. Commentators have noted the judicial tolerance for close corporation practices that devi-
ate from those of the publicly-held corporation. See, e.g., Hornstein, Stockholders'Agreements in
the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950); Note, Dissolution of the Close
Corporation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 239 (1966). See generally F. O'NEAL, "SQuEEZE-OuTS" OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES § 7.14 (1975).
14. See, e.g., Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, - Mass. -, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 328 NE.2d 505 (1975); Cain v. Cain, - Mass. App. Ct. -, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975); 68th St.
Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 NJ. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J.
Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977).
15. See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 1.01. In the leading treatise on the subject of
squeeze-outs of minority shareholders, Professor O'Neal focuses almost exclusively on squeeze-
outs in close corporations. Id.
16. See notes 183-84 infra. Recently, Delaware courts have required a higher fiduciary duty
in publicly-held as well as close corporations. See note 185 infra.
17. "The archetypal lob-5 case is the purchase by one group in a closed corporation of the
interest of another . 1. " I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.2 (1975).
Number 4]
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tion.'8 This Note evaluates the deficiencies inherent in this approach
and the need for distinct application of rule lOb-5 to close corporations.
It begins by reviewing the history of judicial interpretation of rule lOb-
5 and its recent narrowing through a revitalization of the purchaser-
seller requirement19 and the corporate mismanagement exception.2°
The Note then explores the problems inherent in the current restrictive
approach to rule lOb-5, which fails to distinguish close corporations,2
and argues that courts could eliminate these problems by refusing to
apply the rule to close corporations.22 The Note concludes by assessing
the importance of narrowing rule lOb-5 to create optimal corporate
laws and maintain consistency and certainty in the securities market.2 3
II. RULE 10B-5
Rule lOb-5 provides a federal remedy for fraud in securities transac-
tions.2 4 Courts have interpreted the rule as requiring three elements:
25
a fraud or misrepresentation, 26 a purchase or sale of a security,27 and
that the fraud or misrepresentation occur "in connection with" the
18. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), Justice Douglas
asserted:
[T]he fact that the transaction is not conducted through a securities exchange or an orga-
nized over-the-counter market is irrelevant ....
[We read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and contriv-
ances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or
face to face.
Id. at 10, 12. See generally I A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.2(70-71); 2 F. O'NEAL, supra
note 11, at § 8.16. See also Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 993 (1973); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Rude v. Campbell Square, Inc.,
411 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1976); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Siciliano v. Siciliano, 405 F. Supp. 814 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aft'd, 546 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1976); Allen
Organ v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
19. See notes 43-56 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 57-111 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 112-28 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 129-238 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 239-41 infra and accompanying text.
24. See note 4 supra.
25. In addition to the three requirements listed, see text accompanying notes 26-28 i!fra, a
claimant must show a nexus between the -violation and "any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978); see note 4 supra. Courts, however, have construed this
requirement so broadly that it is not a primary requirement of a 1ob-5 claim. See genera/, F.
O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 5.09.
26. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d
714 (2d Cir. 1972); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
27. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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purchase or sale of a security.2" The courts, however, have had diffi-
culty determining the precise scope of the rule29 because its language is
ambiguous. The rule, for instance, does not expressly provide for a
private cause of action 31 or that private transactions in close corpora-
tion securities 31 fall within its purview. Furthermore, the rule does not
delineate the scope of its three basic requirements.32 Consequently,
courts have vacillated between a narrow and a broad reading of the
rule.33
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Cop.34 marked the seminal interpretation
of the scope of rule lOb-5. In Birnbaum, minority shareholders brought
suit after the controlling shareholder rejected an offer of merger, which
would have been highly profitable to all shareholders, in favor of sell-
ing his controlling stock at a premium. Plaintiffs contended that this
premium sale, together with certain misrepresentations, constituted
28. See Bimbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
29. See generally Bauman, The Future of Rule lob-5. A Comment on Jacobs, The Impact of
Rule 1ob-5, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 332 (1976); Jacobs, The Role of the Securities ExchangeAct Rule JOb-
5in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Note, Federal "Go-
ing Private" Standard.4 New Direction for the Second Circuit?, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (1976).
30. Some commentators point out that the rule's drafters did not intend to provide a private
nght of action. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3870 (3d ed. 1969); O'Neal & Janke,
Utilizing Rule lOb-S for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C.
I ND. & COM. L. REv. 327, 331 (1975); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legslative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 632-38 (1963). The judiciary has developed the private
right of action under rule lOb-5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943
(1976); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Many courts have
upheld a rule lob-5 private right of action without discussion. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Rude v. Campbell Square, Inc., 411 F. Supp.
1040 (D.S.D. 1976). See generally I A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 2.4(1) n.47 (27).
31. See Patton, The "Purchase or Sale"Restriction of SEC Rule 10b-5: Judicial Extension of a
Federal Remedy, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 463 (1968). See generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at
§ 8.16; 64 HARV. L. REv. 1018 (1951).
32. See notes 26-28 supra.
33. Compare Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952), with Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric
Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1977). Compare Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969), and Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), with Popkin v. Bishop, 464
F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
35. Id. at 462.
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fraud within the ambit of rule lOb-5. 36 The Second Circuit denied re-
lief, holding that section 10(b) was "directed solely at the type of mis-
representation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of cor-
porate affairs, and that rule lOb-5 extended protection only to de-
frauded purchasers or sellers. '37 This language later became known as
the Birnbaum doctrine.
Courts38 and commentators 39 often cite the Birnbaum doctrine for
the proposition that plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security
to have standing under rule lOb-5. The doctrine, however, narrows the
scope of the rule in two distinct ways.40 First, the Birnbaum doctrine
limits the class of plaintiffs who can assert claims under rule 1Ob-5 by
granting standing only to actual purchasers and sellers of securities. 4'
Second, it limits the class of defendants cognizable under the rule by
requiring that their fraudulent activities be of the kind "usually associ-
ated" with securities transactions rather than merely corporate mis-
management. 42 These two limitations have come to be known as the
purchaser-seller requirement and the corporate mismanagement excep-
tion. Both doctrines have served as important vehicles for judicial ex-
pansion and contraction of the scope of rule lOb-5.
Turning first to the purchaser-seller requirement, the courts, follow-
ing Birnbaum, began to transform the limitation to facilitate access to
the federal courts.43 In accordance with the views of various commen-
tators,44 courts began to erode the vitality of the purchaser-seller re-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 464.
38. See Chasin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F.
Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F.
Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
39. See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule Iob-5, 49 Tux. L. REV. 617
(1971); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine. A New Era/or Rule 10-b5, 54 VA. L.
REv. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Developments ofthe FederalLaw of Corporate Fiduciary Relations.,
Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971).
40. See Note, SEC Rule lOb-5- "In Connection With the Purchase or Sale ofAny Security"
Restriction: Needfor Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 28, 29 (1969).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); A.T. Brod & Co.
v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
44. See Boone & McGowan, supra note 39; Fuller, Another Demise ofthe Birnbaum Doctrine.-
"Tolls the Knell fParting Day"Y, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 131 (1970); Lowenfels, supra note 39;
[Vol. 1978:733
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/11
Number 4] A NEW APPROACH TO RULE 10B-5 739
quirement45 by recognizing exceptions for sales,46 de facto sales,47
aborted purchases and sales,48 injunctive actions, 49  and derivative
suits." Further, some courts completely repudiated the requirement.51
In Blue Chio Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,52 the Supreme Court re-
versed this trend by reaffirming the vitality of the Birnbaum standing
limitations. 3 The Court held that a nonshareholder, who claimed to
have been dissuaded from purchasing shares of stock by fraudulent
statements, could not sue under rule lOb-5.54 Although the Court did
not specifically address any of the judicially-created exceptions to
Birnbaum, Blue Chio raises doubts5 5 about their continued validity. 6
The corporate mismanagement exception, like the purchaser-seller
Ruder, supra note 39. But see Bradford, Rule l0b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 205 (1970); 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 313 (1969).
45. Courts relaxed the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement by including within its scope
investors who had suffered injury from a securities fraud, but who had not in fact purchased or
sold securities. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970);
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
46. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
47. James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
48. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
49. E.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967).
50. Eg., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d
433 (6th Cir. 1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'don other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
51. See, e.g., Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
421 U.S. 723 (1975); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Karvelas v. Sellas, 376 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. I11. 1974); Tully v.
Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972), rep'd, 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976).
52. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
53. Id. at 733.
54. Id. at 755.
55. In response to Blue Chip, recent judicial decisions have rigidly applied the purchaser-
seller requirement. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1975) (trustee
in bankruptcy lacks standing to sue under rule lOb-5); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp.
579 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (nonpurchaser lacks standing to seek injunctive relief); Thompson v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Femer & Smith, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 111 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (upheld aborted pur-
chaser-seller exception to rule lOb-5 applicability).
56. See Gallagher, lOb-S After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L.
REv. 1 (1975); Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under lOb-SAfter Blue Chp Stamps, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 387
(1976).
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requirement, also has a circular history. After a period of acceptance,
57
the doctrine lay dormant5" until the Supreme Court suddenly revital-
ized it in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 59 This exception precludes
a rule 1 Ob-5 action where the cause of action is essentially for corporate
mismanagement, including such conduct as "conflict of interest trans-
actions, . . . compensation, premium sales of control, division of cor-
porate opportunities-in short the whole gamut usually associated with
duties of care and loyalty."60 It bars the application of rule lOb-5 on
the ground that the states have the primary responsibility for protecting
individuals from management overreaching.61 Further, Congress
passed section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to deal with
the narrow problem of fraud in direct securities transactions. 62 A fed-
eral court will only allow a rule lOb-5 corporate mismanagement claim
if the allegation meets the "deception" test 63 under the rule's fraud re-
57. See 1 A. BROMBERO, supra note 17, at § 4.7(532) and authorities cited therein.
58. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), the Court noted:
The Congress made clear that "disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law
should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web" along with manipulation,
investor's ignorance, and the like.
We agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which consti-
tute no more than internal corporate mismanagement. But we read § 10(b) to mean that
Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of
securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face. . . .The control-
ling stockholder owes the corporation a fiduciary obligation ....
Id. at 11-12. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972) ("assertions by a defendant
that the misconduct. . . amounts to 'just' corporate mismanagement will not cut off a plaintiff's
federal remedy"); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 725-30 (2d Cir.), rev'don other grounds on
rehearing en banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (no defense to rule 1Ob-5 claim that alleged wrong-
doing is unassailable under state law); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) (rule lOb-5 not subordinated to, or limited by, state law).
See also Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1972); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d
872, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969); Dasho v. Susque-
hanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
59. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
60. I A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.7(531).
61. See e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-
70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
62. See note 4 supra.
63. For the purposes of this Note, the term, "deception," includes manipulation of securities
transactions. Recent Supreme Court cases, however, have distinguished the deception and manip-
ulation requirements. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195, 199 n.21, 205 (1976).
In Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), Justice White noted that manipulation is
a term of art when used in reference to the securities market. He defined manipulation as "artifi-
cially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors." Id. at 477.
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quirement and the alleged fraud has the requisite connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.64
Courts have vacillated in their approach to the deception require-
ment.65 Many courts initially held fraudulent mismanagement of cor-
porate affairs actionable under rule lOb-5 only if the claimed deception
arose from misstatement or nondisclosure.66 This strict standard, how-
ever, created difficulties because of the possibility of manipulating se-
curities transactions through the use of a controlling influence in the
corporation as well as through deception.67 Thus, in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,68 the Second Circuit abandoned the deception test and held
that a defendant's misuse of his controlling position for his own benefit
could constitute a violation of rule lOb-5. 69 But in Popkin v. Bishop,
70
the same court rejected this "controlling influence" test and found no
violation of rule lOb-5 despite allegations of unfairness due to a con-
trolling influence because defendant had made a full disclosure of all
material facts.7 '
The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,72 recently
resolved the confusion over the applicable standard for the deception
requirement. In Green, a parent company merged with its ninety-five
percent-owned subsidiary pursuant to a Delaware short-form merger
statute for the avowed purpose of squeezing-out minority sharehold-
ers.73 Although the parent strictly complied with the statutory require-
64. For discussions of the application of rule lOb-5 to corporate mismanagement cases, see,
e g, Jacobs, supra note 29; Susman, Use of Rule lob-5 as a Remedyfor Minority Shareholders of
Close Corporations, 22 Bus. LAW. 1193 (1967); Note, supra note 3.
65. Compare Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), and Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964), wth Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing en
bane, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972), and Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir 1967).
66. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339
F 2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See
generaly Note, supra note 3, at 1014-22.
67. See Note, supra note 3, at 1016.
68. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); accord, Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d
Cir 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1976), racated, 429 U.S. 881 (1977).
69. 405 F.2d at 211.
70. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
71. 1d. at 727.
72. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
73. Id. at 465-67.
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ments and furnished shareholders with all relevant information, the
squeezed-out shareholders brought suit seeking rescission and damages
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.74 The Court held that "the claim of
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. . . states a cause of action. . . only
if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as manipulative or deceptive
within the meaning of the statute. 75 Since the defendants had exe-
cuted the merger pursuant to the relevant statute and had not made a
material misrepresentation or omitted to state a material fact, the Court
found there was no violation of the section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 decep-
tion test.76
In addition to the deception requirement, the requisite relationship
between the deception and the securities transaction must also exist for
a rule lOb-5 cause of action. In short, the claim must meet the "in
connection with" requirement.77 A case, of course, meets the "in con-
nection with" requirement when the fraud concerns the value or con-
sideration offered in exchange for the securities. 78 The "in connection
with" problem, however, becomes more significant when the securities
transaction is part of a larger scheme to defraud the corporation.79 In
this context, one must determine whether the necessary nexus exists be-
tween the transaction and the fraud. 0
Courts, at first, strictly construed the statutory language and required
a very close connection between the transaction and the fraud.8' The
Birnbaum case, though referring to the "in connection with" require-
ment only in dictum, set the model of strict construction for subsequent
cases.8" Courts have interpreted Birnbaum as requiring that the
purchase or sale of securities be "at the crux" of the fraudulent
scheme.83
74. Id. at 465.
75. Id at 473-74.
76. Id. at 474. The Court also noted that the conduct was not manipulative within the mean-
ing of the statute. Id. at 476-77.
77: See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.7 (570-76).
78. Id. See Note, supra note 3, at 1010.
79. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
80. Id.
81. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
82. See, e.g., Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) "[R]elief [for the minority
shareholder] will not be judicially available until the words 'in connection with the purchase or
sale'. . . are interpreted less restrictively than in Birnbaum. ... Id. at 229.
83. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971), where the court noted:
[Vol. 1978:733
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In 197 1, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. ,84 the Supreme Court reversed the trend of strictly construing the
"in connection with" language of rule lOb-5.85 Justice Douglas, writing
for a unanimous Court, rejected the lower court's requirement86 that
the purchase or sale be "at the crux of the fraudulent scheme"8 7 or "be
the sole object of the fraud."88 Rather, the Court required that the in-
jury result from "deceptive practices touching its sale of securities."8 9
In order to sustain a complaint alleging fraud under [rule lOb-5] it must appear with
reasonable clarity from the face of the complaint either (1) that a purchase or sale of
securities is at the crux of a fraudulent scheme; or (2) that inducing a purchase or sale of
securities is the object of a fraudulent scheme; or (3) that fraudulent statements, misstate-
ments, or omissions are made in a manner which is reasonably calculated to influence
the investing public, or are of the sort which the reasonable investing public might rely
upon; or (4) that the trading process is abused through potential market manipulation or
the spread of watered stock.
Id at 1101. See generally Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule 10b-5 Application to Acts
of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 674, 680 (1972). See also Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 (5th Cir.) (purchase must be central to the fraud), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Drachmnan v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 732 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'don rehearing en banc,
453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (fraud must be intrinsic to security transaction); Herpich v. Wallace,
430 F.2d 792, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchase or sale must be subject or purpose of scheme);
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539, 543 (N.D. I11. 1970) (no rule lOb-5 action if
purchase is incidental); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (peripheral
connection insufficient).
84. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
85. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., agreed to sell its wholly owned subsidiary, Manhattan
Casualty Co., to James Begole for five million dollars. Prior to the closing, Begole arranged to pay
the purchase price with a check issued by Irving Trust Co. Since Begole had no funds on deposit
with Irving, he caused Manhattan, after acquiring the company, to sell its government bonds to
cover the five million dollar check. Begole and the other conspirators concealed their scheme by
manipulating the corporate books. Id. at 7.
86. The district court, 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), held that the plaintiffs did not state
a cause of action cognizable under rule l0b-5. First, the court noted that Congress had enacted
§ 10(b) to maintain the integrity of the securities market. Id. at 1101. Since Manhattan sold the
bonds for their full value, the court reasoned that the integrity of the securities market had not
been impaired by the misappropriation of the proceeds after the sale. The court also asserted that
the fraud did not lie at the "crux" of the securities transaction. Id. at 1098. The Second Circuit,
430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), affirmed using essentially the same rationale. Id. at 367.
87. 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
88. 430 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1970).
89. 404 U.S. at 12-13. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the "in connection with" clause
is unusually broad. Based on the facts presented, the Court could have concluded that the fraudu-
lent misappropriation was at the crux of the security transaction or that the misappropriation
could not be separated from the security transaction. That the Court reevaluated the connection
necessary for a rule lOb-5 cause of action and held that the fraud "touched" the transaction indi-
cates the liberality of the Court's interpretation. See generally Ryan, Bankers Life. Birnbaum
Reconsidered, 4 LoY. CHi L.J. 47 (1973); Note, Bankers Lfe: Payingfor a Corporation by Selling
its Securities Violates 10b-5, 1972 DuKE L.J. 465; 50 N.C.L. REv. 943 (1972).
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Subsequent courts broadly interpreted Bankers Lie9° by treating
"touching" as a synonym for "in connection with."9' Courts began us-
ing rule lOb-5 to cover all fraudulent activities,92 not just those usually
associated with the sale or purchase of a security.93 And courts applied
the rule to misconduct after the sale or purchase,94 misconduct "in con-
nection with" someone else's sale,95 unconsummated transactions,9 6
and other situations.97 Some courts began integrating transactions98
90. See Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d
811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir.
1973); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Wall-
ing v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473
F.2d 515, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1973); Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 529
(7th Cir. 1972); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 1976); Karvelas
v. Sellas, 376 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 63
F.R.D. 39, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
91. See, e.g., Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). See generall 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.7 (574(3)).
Bromberg defines the "touching" standard as follows: "Misconduct has 'connection' with a secur-
ity transaction if it has a not insignificant factual or financial relation with the transaction and
affects (or touches) an investor interest in the security." Id.
92. In International Inv. Trust v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), Judge Friendly
said that the contours of the mismanagement exception "have been receding ... and despite the
need, under Birnbaum. . ., to find a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, are likely
to recede still further under the continuing impact of Bankers Lie." Id. at 1013-14.
93. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Note, supra note 40, at 32.
94. E.g., Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Allico Nat'l Corp.
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 397 F.2d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 1968); Voege v. American Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D. Del. 1969); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972,
978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.7 (574(3)).
95. Eg., Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 397 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1968); Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Bogess v. Hogan,
328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1971). See also 1 A. BROMBERO, supra note 17, at § 4.7 (573(2)).
96. Hadsell v. Hoover, 484 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1973); Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476
F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971).
97. See 5 A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5, § 38.Olb (2-34) (1978) and authorities
cited therein.
98. See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970) (upheld entire claim
though plaintiff had standing on only one transaction), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Shell v.
Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970) (upheld entire claim though parts were nonsecurities trans-
actions); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (corporation could sue for all transac-
tions though only some involved breaches). See also Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc.,
461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972); Voege v. American Tobacco Corp., 421 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1969);
Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But see Haberman v. Mur-
chison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aft'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/11
Number 4] A NEW APPROACH TO RULE 10B-5
and permitting "recovery for otherwise unassailable transactions by
viewing a scheme involving many transactions as though they were one
plan." 9 For example, in Drachman v.-flarvey, t°° the Second Circuit
upheld a rule 10b-5 claim by linking as one scheme' two transac-
tions, t02 "neither of which standing alone would violate rule l0b-5."' °3
But in light of the recent Supreme Court trend limiting rule lOb-5,
many lower courts have begun to strictly construe the "in connection
with" requirement.'" In Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein, °5 the
court narrowed the "in connection with" requirement by relying on
Blue Chip Stamps,"6 even though the latter case does not deal directly
with the nexus element. Most courts, however, have justified a closer
nexus based on a narrow reading of Bankers Life."° 7 For example, in
Ketchum v. Green'"8 and Tully v. Mott,"°9 the Third Circuit rendered a
strict interpretation of the Bankers Life "touch" test to limit rule 1 Ob-5
and discourage the incursion of federal courts into activities regulated
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 228-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
99. See 5a A. JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 115.02 (5-12).
100. 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1971).
101. In the first hearing of the Drachman case, before Bankers .1fe, the court refused to link
the "two transactions." Id at 731.
102. 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
103. 453 F.2d at 732.
104. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 562 F.2d
1040 (8th Cir. 1977) (executors brought suit alleging the corporation exercised its stock transfer
restriction to further a fraudulent scheme; court held that the transaction did not meet the "in
connection with" requirement because the loss was due to the stock transfer restriction or the
shareholder's death and not a material nondisclosure), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Ketchum
v, Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977) (strict connection requirement;
no intermediate steps between fraud and security); Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank,
430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (must allege nexus between the alleged rule lOb-5 violation
and plaintiff's purchase of bank stock); Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein, 407 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (issuer brought suit against chief executive officer claiming he defrauded purchas-
ers of its securities; court ruled that the "in connection with" requirement was not met because
there was no direct causal nexus between the fraud and the sale); Myers v. American Leisure Time
Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff must allege that he bought stock in
connection with the claimed violation), aff'd, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Competitive
Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); Crofoot v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
105. 407 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
106. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
107. See e.g., Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 539 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1977); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973);
Blackett v. Clinton E. Frank, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 941, 946-47 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
108. 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977).
109. 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976).
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by state law. 10
This trend restricting the "in connection with" requirement will have
a strong impact on the vitality of the corporate mismanagement excep-
tion. As Professor Folk noted, the "in connection with" element is the
the "hardiest of the several restrictions which have been used to contain
the inexorable growth of private rights of action under rule I Ob-5."'
Requiring a close connection between the fraud and the securities
transaction will, of course, allow only mismanagement and self-dealing
claims that are closely related to a securities transaction to be heard in
federal court. And the strict construction of the "in connection with"
requirement, when combined with the courts' refusal to adopt a con-
trolling influence test for the deception element, may lead to a revitali-
zation of the corporate mismanagement exception. With both the
110. In Tully, plaintiffs, class A shareholders brought suit against defendants, class C share.
holders, for violating rule lOb-5 in their purchase of class A treasury shares. Id. at 189-91. Plain-
tiffs alleged that an agreement required that the treasury shares be offered first for sale to class A
shareholders. Id. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged
fraud did not have the requisite connection with the sale of securities. Id. at 193-94. The court
asserted that the fraud did not occur in the actual sale of stock, but rather in the refusal to sell the
remaining class A shares in accordance with the agreement. id. at 194. By requiring a direct
causal connection, the Tully court circumvented a loose interpretation of the Bankers Life "touch"
test. Id.
In Ketehum, plaintiffs alleged they were fraudulently terminated from their positions as presi-
dent and chairman of the board. Their discharge activated the company's stock retirement plan,
forcing them to sell their stock. Plaintiffs refused to surrender their stock and brought suit to
enjoin their ouster and to recover damages. Id. at 1023-24. The court held that defendant had not
violated rule lOb-5 because the deception, if present, had not occurred in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. Id. at 1025. Rather, the deception occurred in connection with a
struggle for control of the corporation and therefore fell within the corporate mismanagement
exception. Md.
The Ketehum court relied on Bankers Life to support its strict interpretation of the "in connec-
tion with" requirement, asserting that the Bankers Life "touch" test, though commonly interpreted
broadly, actually requires a close connection. Id. at 1027. The court construed the "touch" test as
being limited by the mismanagement exception and asserted that a conflict would not be drawn
under rule lOb-5 if the action essentially was for corporate mismanagement. Id. at 1027-28.
Ketchum's narrow interpretation of Bankers Life, however, seems suspect. Although Justice
Douglas, in Bankers Life, asserted that Congress did not seek to regulate transactions that consti-
tute no more than internal corporate mismanagement, the thrust of the opinion leans toward
broadening the scope of rule lOb-5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
Furthermore, in Bankers Life, the Court recognized a rule lOb-5 action in a fact situation that
the Supreme Court today would likely perceive as falling squarely under the heading of corporate
mismanagement.
The Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari in Ketchum, 434 U.S. 940 (1977), and it seems
that the trend of narrowing the "in connection with" requirement by narrowly reading Bankers
Life will continue.
111. Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 VA. L. REv. 755, 812 (1970).
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corporate mismanagement exception and the purchaser-seller require-
ment regaining vitality, the courts are well on their way to restricting a
shareholder's ability to secure a federal remedy.
III. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF RULE 10B-5
A. Underlying Policy Arguments
The narrowing of the scope of rule lOb-5 has resulted from the
courts' desire to halt the intrusion of the federal securities laws into
corporate management, an area traditionally reserved for the states. 12
Courts have asserted that Congress did not intend rule 1 Ob-5 to create a
federal corporation law' and thus have tried to limit its use in the
corporate mismanagement context." 4 They have recognized that when
courts expand the federal securities laws into the mismanagement
area,"15 even if no preemption of state law occurs as a matter of law,
plaintifis preference for the federal forum leads to preemption as a
112. As Judge Moore pointed out in his dissent to Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d
1283 (2d Cir. 1975) (Moore, J., dissenting), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the broadening of the scope
of rule I Ob-5 "nulliflies] not only the corporate laws of Delaware with respect to short-form corpo-
rate mergers, but also, in effect, comparable laws in an additional thirty-seven States." Id. at 1299.
Furthermore, he asserted the plaintiffs were granted a substantive right "unrelated to the anti-
fraud scheme of the federal securities laws and in complete derogation of a valid state rule regu-
lating corporate activity." Id. at 1307. The Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in
full accord with Judge Moore's comments, said: "Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where fed-
eral law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state
law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. at 84. See also Kaminsky v. Abrams,
281 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal jurisdiction "might well lead the states to abandon
their creative and effective role in this area of the law"); Condon v. Richardson, 275 F. Supp. 943,
948 (S.D. II1. 1967), rev'd, 411 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1969); 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.7
(513(1-3)).
113. Commentators have noted that rule lOb-5 is spawning a federal law of corporations. See,
e.g., Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum." The Exchange Act and Self-A4ggrandizement,
15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 349-50 (1973); Fleischer, "'Federal Corporation Law" An Assessment, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 1146 (1965); Jacobs, supra note 29, at 33-34; 55 VA. L. REv. 1103, 1120-21 (1969).
114. See Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970) (rule lOb-5 should be limited in its application to areas controlled by
state corporation law). See also 1 L. Loss, SECuRtTins REGULATION 107-11 (2d ed. 1961) (noting
Congress' long resistance to total federal preemption).
115. Commentators have suggested alternatives to expansion of liability under rule lOb-5.
See. e.g., Borden, Going Private. Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987, 1037
(1976) (return regulatory power to the states); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law. Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701-03 (1974) (rejects notion of a federal corporation law as
politically unrealistic and suggests as an alternative a "federal Corporate Uniformity Act," which
would impose nationwide uniform corporate responsibility standards). See generally Note, supra
note 29, at 450.Washington University Open Scholarship
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matter of fact.' 16
The threat of vexatious litigation has also spurred courts to narrow
the scope of rule lOb-5."17 As Justice Rehnquist noted in Blue Chip
Stamps, the plaintiff often has served as a front for lawyers interested
primarily in fees payable in the final analysis by the innocent inves-
tors.' t In addition, Justice Rehnquist indicated that although these
cases have proven difficult to win at trial, they have proven even more
difficult to dispose of before trial.1 9 Inevitably, they have forced cor-
porations into settlement because of the potential for severe disruption
of business operations.
Some commentators, however, maintain that these arguments are
without merit. First, they have noted that most state corporation laws
reflect the interests of management. 20 These statutes were designed to
116. An important reason for the choice of the federal forum lies in the procedural advantage
of suing under rule lOb-5. The Securities Exchange Act calls for exclusive jurisdiction and is
accompanied by broad venue and nationwide service of process provisions. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(aa) (1976). Furthermore, plaintiffs can sue under the Securities Ex-
change Act and not be subject to the state security for cost statute. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961). The Securities Exchange Act also provides more liberal rules for payment of attorneys'
fees. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-96 (1970). Finally, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure may allow more flexibility in such matters as discovery, FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37,
and class actions, FED. R. CIr. P. 23. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REa-
ULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 1047-53 (4th ed. 1977); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation
Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 991, 1001 (1976); O'Neal & Janke, supra note 30, at 343-46; Note, The Pros-
pectsrfor Rule 10b-5:4n Emerging Remedyfor Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123, 1126
(1950).
The shareholder-plaintiff was also likely to choose a federal forum because, in the past, states'
substantive laws of fiduciary duties were favorable to management. This was particularly true in
Delaware. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964);
Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963). See generally Cary, supra note
115; Conrad, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 623 (1973); Eisenberg,
The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1407 (1974); Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 409
(1968).
117. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
118. Id. at 739. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
119. See, e.g., Boone & McGowan, supra note 39, at 648-49; Dooley, The Effect of CivilLiabil-
ity on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 822-43 (1972); Sargent,
The See and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. "REv. 553,
562-72 (1974).
120. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 115, at 668 (state cannot effectively provide a responsible cor-
porate statute); Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5, 23 Bus. LAW. 593, 596 (1968) ("one of the
principal reasons for the various anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws ... was the
realization that the national problem could not be dealt with adequately by state law"). See
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encourage entrepreneurs to incorporate within the state. 12 1 As a result,
both the statutes122 and the judicial decisions 123 have given little protec-
tion to minority shareholders.' 24 Thus it has been suggested that the
courts should use rule lOb-5 to provide more adequate protection for
minority shareholders. 25  Further, some have argued that courts
general/y Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Management
Control, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1976); Jennings, supra note 116; Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in
the Management ofthe Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976).
121. See Folk, supra note 116, at 417. "The next question is whether, indeed, any state today
can effectively implement interests other than those of management.... My considered conclu-
sion is that this is not possible, even though many will be grieved at the thought that state power to
regulate internal affairs of corporations is so drastically circumscribed." Id. See generally Jen-
nings, supra note 116.
Traditionally, the states have had an opportunity to play an important role in providing
balanced corporate regulation. . . .The inadequacy of these statutes as instruments of
corporate control is common knowledge. They are essentially enabling acts with the
accent upon flexibility in facilitating business transactions and providing maximum pro-
tection for managerial decisions. They contain many loopholes for an irresponsible
management and a minimum of protective provisions in the interest of shareholders.
Id. at 991-92. See also Cary, supra note 115, at 666-71; Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71, 74-78 (1972); Comment, Lawfor Sale. A Study of the
Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
122. The Delaware legislature has treated management especially well. As Professor Cary
noted, Delaware has clearly won the "'race for the bottom" and the spectre of Delaware hurts
reform efforts in all of its sister states. Cary, supra note 115, at 666; see Folk, supra note 116, at
412.
123. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly
Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Hariton
v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d
136 (1960). See generally Cary, supra note 115; Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate
Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958); Latty, Why Are Busi-
ness Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling", 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
124. But see, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93,460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969); Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), rev'g 285 A.2d 430 (Del. Ch. 1971); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58
Il 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1(1974); Kerrigan v. United Say. Ass'n, 58 Ill. 2d 20, 317 N.E.2d 39 (1974);
Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1975); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
125. See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,729 (2d Cir. 1971) ("we are concerned here with
an important enforcement provision ... intended not only to expand the common law, but to
create new, far-reaching, and uniform laws of shareholder management relations in congression-
ally designated areas of substantive corporation law"); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (rule lOb-5 was designed to reach the infinite variety of devices by which
undue advantage may be taken of investors), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (2d Cir.) (§10(b) is "part of a statutory scheme which had as its
purpose the creation of a new federal law of management-stockholder relations. . . impos[ing]
broad fiduciary duties on management vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders"),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
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should expand rule lOb-5 to create a uniform, nationwide standard that
would provide greater stability in the securities market. 126
Whether the ambit of rule lOb-5 should be expanded or restricted
has been the subject of frequent debate. 27 Consequently, the courts
have vacillated in their interpretation of the scope of the rule. 12  Judi-
cial consistency may, however, be possible if courts would distinguish
the close corporation in applying rule lOb-5.
B. Distinguishing the Close Corporation
Courts have uniformly refused to distinguish the close corporation
under rule l0b-5. 129 This approach is particularly curious in light of
the rule's purpose 13°--to protect investors and traders in public securi-
126. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, at § 4.7 (514(2-3)), where the author notes:
Although there will always be variations in approach and application, these variations
are likely to be fewer and less drastic within the federal court system than among the 50
states. Uniformity becomes more appropriate as share ownership becomes more dis-
persed. There are strong reasons to give an owner of a security listed on the New York
Stock Exchange the same protection whether the issuing company is incorporated in
California or Delaware, and whether he lives in Illinois or Texas.
See generally Cohen, supra note 120; Rosenfeld, An Essay in Support of the Second Circuit'r Deci-
sions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L.R.
111 (1976).
127. See notes 112-26 supra and accompanying text.
128. Compare Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), with Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co,, 404
U.S. 6 (1971); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.), rev'don other grounds on rehear-
ing en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), and Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1977).
129. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
130. As Professor Jacobs notes, the administrative history of rule lob-5 reveals the central
reason for its promulgation. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 5.01 (1-120 to 1-125). Courts that
have analyzed the administrative history of rule lOb-5 have concluded that the rule was not in-
tended to cover fraudulent mismanagement, but only "to make the same prohibitions contained in
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to purchasers as well as to sellers." Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Furthermore, in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the Second
Circuit declared there is nothing "about Rule lOb-5 which demonstrates that the SEC sought by
the Rule not fully to implement the Congressional purpose and objectives underlying Section
10(b)." Id. at 860.
The preamble and § 2, which set forth the general purposes of the Act, are the most useful
evidence for determining congressional intent. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 5.01 (1-113).
The preamble announces that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the regulation of securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and
for other purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976).
Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976), provides:
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ties.' Thus it seems inappropriate to apply rule lOb-5 to the pri-
vately-held close corporation.132 The courts, however, have justified
their continued application of the rule to close corporations on two
grounds: (1) the vulnerability of minority shareholders, and (2) the in-
adequacy of the state court system.
In the close corporation, minority shareholders often leave them-
selves vulnerable to oppressive squeeze-out techniques. 33  Squeeze-
outs have been defined as the "use by some owners or participants in a
business enterprise of strategic position, inside information, or power of
control, or the use of some legal device or technique to eliminate from
the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants." '13  In the close
corporation, controlling shareholders frequently use squeeze-outs to
manipulate corporate decisionmaking. 135 This is facilitated by the in-
ability of minority shareholders to avail themselves of the self-help
remedy, which members of the publicly-held corporation have through
the sale of their shares, 36 or entrepreneurs in a partnership have
through dissolution. 137 The oppressed minority shareholder, unable to
sell his shares or dissolve the corporation, must seek judicial relief.
Since the minority shareholder's suit usually includes a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholders,1 38 his case
"[Tjransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon the securities exchanges and over-the-
counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions. Id. See generally 5 A. JACOBS, supra note
97, at § 5.01 (1-113).
131. The legislative and administrative histories of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are extremely
sparse. See 5a A. JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 5.01 (1-109). Thus the Supreme Court has empha-
sized Congress' choice of words in drafting § 10(b). See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
132. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 7.09.
133. Id. at § 1.01.
134. Id. For explanation of the various kinds of squeeze-out techniques, see id. at §§ 3.01-
6.10. See also 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 8.07; Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
135. See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 1.07; 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 8.07.
136. See generally F. O'NE.AL, supra note 13, at § 2.15; 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 1.07.
137. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(1975). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at §§ 3.05, 3.08-.09, 3.15-.16, 9.04-.05; Note, supra
note 13, at 240-41. See also 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 9.09, where the author suggests
broadening the grounds for dissolution of close corporations.
138. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., - Mass. -, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E. 2d 505 (1975); Cain v. Cain, -
Mass. App. Ct. -, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975); 68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super.
546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), aft'd, 150 N.J. Super. 42, 374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977).
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would ordinarily be heard in state court. In the past, however, recovery
in this forum was difficult because of the state courts' reluctance to in-
terfere in the internal affairs of the corporation.1 39 In denying relief to
the aggrieved shareholder, the state courts have relied on two basic
principles: (1) the business judgment rule, and (2) the principle of ma-
jority rule."4° The business judgment rule immunizes management
from liability where the transaction is within its authority and the
power of the corporation.' 4 ' It springs from the courts' hesitancy to
substitute its judgment for that of management on business policy
questions. 142 The majority rule concept, in contrast, recognizes the
right of the majority shareholders to govern the corporation. t43 These
two principles have led many state courts'44 to refuse to aid squeeze-
out victims unless the majority has acted in a grossly abusive
manner. 1
45
Realizing the inequities of the state courts' orientation, 46 the federal
courts have broadened the scope of rule lOb-5 to include breach of
fiduciary duty within close corporations.' 47 This extension, however,
may no longer be necessary in light of a striking reversal in the state
courts' approach to minority shareholders, especially in the area of
fiduciary responsibilities in close corporations.' 41
A fiduciary relationship arises when "one holds a position of superi-
ority and influence over the interest of another such that the latter is
forced to rely upon the good faith and fair dealings of the former.149
This concept of a fiduciary relationship evolved slowly in the corporate
setting. ' 50 At first, courts interpreted the duties of directors and officers
139. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
140. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 3.03.
141. Id.
142. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 231 (rev. ed 1946).
143. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 3.03.
144. See Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975); Meyerson v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967); Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 454 (1871); Cole
Real Estate Corp. v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 310 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Green v,
Felton, 42 Ind. App. 675, 84 N.E. 166 (1908); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234
(1934); Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192 (rex. Civ. App. 1975).
145. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 3.03.
146. See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 166-84 infra and accompanying text.
149. B. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1569, at 624 (1959) (footnote omitted); accord,
Finch & Long, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Minority Shareholders, 9
HASTINGS L.J. 306, 307 (1958). See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
150. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 7.13.
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as running only towards the corporation. 15' But courts later recognized
that directors and officers, as well as controlling shareholders, owe a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.
15 2
Although courts uniformly held that corporate management stood in
a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders, they
did not maintain the same uniformity on the question of the stringency
of the duty.'53 Some courts applied a lenient standard, requiring bad
faith and abuse of discretion, 154 and other courts recognized a strict
fiduciary standard.'5 5 This inconsistency could have been avoided if
courts had not halted the early common law approach of distinguishing
the close corporation.
At the early common law, courts applied a "strict trust"'156 test to
determine whether the officers and directors of a close corporation had
adhered to their fiduciary duty. 7 They maintained that the same strict
fiduciary duties imposed on a trustee in the management of a trust for a
beneficiary applied to the directors, officers, and controlling sharehold-
ers of a close corporation. 58
State courts later began to apply a more lenient standard, 59 requir-
ing merely good faith and inherent fairness.' 60 This test usually led to
151. Id. at § 715 n.4 and authorities cited therein.
152. Id. at § 713 nn.6 & 7 and authorities cited therein.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Burke v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 324 F. Supp. 1125, 1129 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Bruce v.
E.L. Bruce Co., 404 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (1961); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel &
Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 18, 120 A. 486, 494 (1923); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 197 Misc. 562, 565, 73
N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 331, 337,67 S.E.2d 355, 360
(1951).
155. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 111, 460 P.2d 464, 473, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 601 (1969); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 78
(1969). See also note 124 supra and cases cited therein.
156. See, e.g., Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R.R., 103 N.Y. 58, 74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886). See
generally 61 IOwA L. REV. 876, 887-93 (1976).
157. Peckham v. Lane, 81 Kan. 489, 106 P. 464 (1910); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P.
277 (1904); Sargent v. Kansas Midland R.R., 48 Kan. 672, 29 P. 1063 (1892); Kavanaugh v. Kava-
naugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R.R., 103
N Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
158. See Bayne, supra note 156. For later cases that analogize a corporate trustee's duties to
the duties of a common law trustee, see Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 111, 460
P 2d 464, 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 601 (1969); Zampetti v. Cavanaugh, 406 Pa. 259, 267, 176 A.2d
906, 910 (1961); Point Trap Co. v. Manchester, 98 R.I. 49, 54, 199 A.2d 592, 596 (1964).
159. Bastain v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), af9'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970);
Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 I11. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43
N.E.2d 18 (1942). For an analysis of the difference between the strict trust approach and the good
faith-inherent fairness standard, see 61 IowA L. REV. 876, 890-93 (1976).
160. Some courts treated the fiduciary duties of directors as running only in favor of the cor-
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a denial of relief for minority shareholders. t6t For unlike the strict
trust approach, which voided a transaction if a plaintiff could show a
conflict of interest,1 62 the good faith-inherent fairness test allowed the
corporate manager or majority shareholder engaged in a conflict of in-
terest transaction to escape liability by proving its inherent fair-
ness 163 -a task that often proved to be relatively easy.164 Thus the
federal courts were forced to extend rule lob-5 to grant relief to op-
pressed close corporation shareholders. 165
Some state courts, however, have recently returned to the strict trust
standard. 66 Most notably, a series of Massachusetts cases 167 have ap-
plied a standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty"'' 68 to the other
shareholders.
In Donahue v. RoddElectrotype Co. 169 the Massachusetts court held
that a controlling group of shareholders had breached their fiduciary
poration and not to the minority shareholders. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note I1, at § 8.16. Courts
later determined, however, that majority shareholders have a fiduciary duty to the minority share-
holders. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919), wherein Justice Bran-
deis noted: "The majority has the right to control. . . .It is the fact of control of the common
property held and exercised, not the particular means by which or manner in which the control is
exercised, that creates the fiduciary obligation." Id. at 487-92. See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 306 (1939); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gates, 376
F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967); Overfield v. Pennroad, 42 F. Supp. 586, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
161. See notes 167-84 infra and accompanying text.
162. See Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 73, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886).
163. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Noe v. Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975). See
generally 61 IowA L. REv. 876, 890-91 (1976).
164. See, e.g., Noe v. Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975); Munson v. Syracuse, G & C. R.R.,
103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
165. Courts have noted that rule lOb-5 incorporates at least as strict a fiduciary duty as the
state courts that apply a strict fiduciary standard. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909);
Barnett v. Kirshner, 527 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1975); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 412 F.
Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 5.09.
166. See, e.g., Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Zokoych v. Spalding,
36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 344 N.E.2d 805 (1976); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, - Mass. -, 353
N.E.2d 657 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975);
Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 240 N.W.2d 507 (1976); 68th St. Apartments, Inc.
v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), a]7d, 150 N.J. Super. 42, 374
A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d
122 (1975); Delaney v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 278 Ore. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977). See also note 183
infra.
167. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, - Mass. -, - 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578,-, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975); Cain v. Cain, -
Mass. App. Ct. -, -, 334 N.E.2d 650, 654 (1975).
168. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975).
169. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).https://openscholar hip.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/11
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duty by failing to offer minority shareholders an equal opportunity to
repurchase shares from one member of the controlling group1 70 be-
cause they had not acted "with utmost good faith and loyalty to the
other shareholders."' 7' The court reasoned that the same strict fiduci-
ary duty needed to maintain a stable partnership also applied to the
close corporation because of the similarity between the two kinds of
business organizations.' 72 The Donahue court did recognize that the
difficulty of obtaining dissolution distinguished the close corpora-
tion.1 73 But, the court asserted, this difference made the higher fiduci-
ary standard in the close corporation even more imperative. 17
4
The Supreme Judicial Court later modified the Donahue standard in
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. 175 The court indicated that the
"utmost good faith" test should be tempered with a business purpose
test to avoid hampering effective management. 176 A balance must be
struck between the "majority's right to self-ownership" and their fiduci-
ary obligation to the minority shareholders. 77 To achieve this balance,
the court enunciated a two-part test.'78 First, the controlling share-
holder must establish a legitimate business purpose for the action.'
79
Second, upon a showing of legitimate business purpose, the minority
shareholder may demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could
be achieved by a less intrusive course of action. 80
Although Wilkes gave majority shareholders somewhat greater lati-
tude than Donahue,' its reaffirmation of the strict fiduciary duty of
"utmost good faith and loyalty in the close corporation" is indicative of
the trend toward increased protection of minority shareholders. 8 2 And
170. Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 508-11.
171. Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
172. Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 511-16.
173. Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 5 14-15.
174. Id
175. - Mass. -, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
176. Id at -, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Note, Close Corporations. Strict Good Faith Fiduciary Duty Applied to Controlling
Stockholders, 38 LA. L. REv. 214 (1977); 61 MASS. L.Q. 219 (1977).
182. See F. O'NF.AL, supra note 13, at 7 (Supp. 1978). Following Wilkes, Massachusetts
courts have continued to recognize a strict fiduciary duty in close corporations. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Corgain, - Mass. -, 370 N.E.2d 447 (1978); Ralston v. Anthony, - Mass. -, 364
N.E.2d 1289 (1977); Jessie v. Boynton. - Mass. -, 361 N.E.2d 1267 (1977).
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the trend is spreading beyond Massachusetts as other courts apply the
Donahue standard 18 3 or insist upon a higher fiduciary duty in close
corporations. 1
84
Recent cases also reveal this clear trend in the state courts of granting
greater protection to minority shareholders in both public'85 and close
corporations.' 86 This may have been stimulated by the constriction of
183. See, e.g., Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 426 F. Supp 908 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Comolli v.
Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1977); Trust Co. Bank v. Union Circulation Co.,
241 Ga. 343, 245 S.E.2d 297 (1977); Sampson v. Hunt, 222 Kan. 268, 564 P.2d 489 (1977); Ritchie
v. McGrath, 571 P.2d 17 (Kan. App. 1977); 68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super.
546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 42, 374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977);
Delaney v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 278 Ore. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977).
184. See Delano v. Kitch, 542 F.2d 550 (10th Cir. 1976) (trial court erred in not advising jury
that mere disclosure of personal profit is not enough to satisfy strict fiduciary duty standard);
Hilton v. Mumaw, 522 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1975) (shareholder's position as officer and director does
not relieve other directors of fiduciary duties they owe him as shareholder, especially in close
corporation); Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 426 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (in close corporation,
directors and controlling shareholders owe very highest duty of good faith); Jones v. H.F. Ahman-
son & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (strict fiduciary duty in close
corporation); Zokoych v. Spalding, 36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 344 N.E.2d 805 (1976) (in two-person
corporation, shareholders have duty to act fairly, honestly, and with utmost good faith toward
each other); Sampson v. Hunt, 222 Kan. 268, 564 P.2d 489 (1977) (insider has strict fiduciary duty
to disclose known facts affecting value of stock); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 373 N.Y.S.2d
132, 335 N.E.2d 334 (1975) (close corporation directors required to show not only that sale was for
bona fide corporate purpose but also that objective could not have been accomplished by other
means that would not have disturbed proportionate stock ownership); Delaney v. Georgia-Pac.
Corp., 278 Ore. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977) (strict fiduciary duty in close corporation).
Many courts recognize greater protection by analogizing the duties of directors and controlling
shareholders in close corporations to the duties imposed on common law trustees. See, e.g., At-
kinson v. Marquart, 112 Ariz. 304, 541 P.2d.556 (1975); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Superior Court,
51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975); Petty v. Penntech Papers Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del.
Ch. 1975); Kerrigan v. Unity Say. Ass'n, I1 Ill. App. 3d 766, 297 N.E.2d 699 (1973); Berkowitz v.
Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975); Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 442
Pa. 256, 276 A.2d 305 (1971); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wash App. 691, 469 P.2d 583
(1970); Grongnet v. Fox Valley Trucking Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 235, 172 N.W.2d 812 (1969).
Other courts, however, have recognized the Donahue approach, iLe., comparing the duties of
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders to the duties partners owe to each other. See, e.g.,
Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, -
Mass. -, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Cain v. Cain, - Mass. App. Ct. -, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975); 68th
Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), ajl'd, 150
N.J. Super. 42, 374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977).
For earlier cases using the partnership approach, see Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967);
Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Klup, 41 111. 2d
215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968); Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571
(1941); Krueger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802,210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965) (Fuld, J., dissent-
ing). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at §§ 7.13-.14.
185. See, eg., Fisher v. Pennsylvania Life Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 506, 138 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1977);
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379
A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
186. See note 184 supra.
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rule lOb-5.' 87 As the Court has narrowed its scope, state courts have
dramatically increased the duties of corporate managers and majority
shareholders, 18 particularly in the area of squeeze-out mergers.
In a squeeze-out merger, the corporate managers or controlling
shareholders, usually without deception or manipulation, 189 implement
a merger to eliminate minority shareholders. 9 ' Although the courts
initially limited the minority shareholder to an appraisal remedy' 9' or
fair valuation of the worth of their shares,' 92 some courts have recently
begun to protect minority shareholders by enjoining such mergers.' 93
For example, a New York court1 94 enjoined a squeeze-out merger,
which did not have a proper business purpose, 195 even though the engi-
neers of the merger had not engaged in misrepresentation or deception
and had complied fully with the state merger statute.' 96
The Delaware courts have demonstrated even greater determination
to protect the rights of squeezed-out minority shareholders. 97 In
187. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. Although there is no definitive evidence that
the Supreme Court's restriction of rule lOb-5 stimulated the recognition of a higher fiduciary duty
in the state courts, it seems possible that the realization that minority shareholders could no longer
obtain federal relief might have affected state courts' willingness to provide a state remedy for
shareholders. This trend in the state courts may have been further stimulated by the insightful
views of a leading commentator. See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13.
188. See notes 185-86 supra.
189. See discussion of Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in notes 72-76
supra and accompanying text.
190. These mergers are typically employed to change a public corporation to a private corpo-
ration. The parent company through a merger with the subsidiary forces the liquidation of the
minority interest in the publicly-held subsidiary. In compliance with the state merger statute, the
parent may eliminate the minority by tendering a cash-out price, which the minority either must
accept or have judicially appraised. See generally Borden, supra note 115; Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose
Test/or Going Private, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184 (1976); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903
(1975).
191. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Stauffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d
503 (1939).
192. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness ofthe Dissenting Stockholders' Appraisal Rights, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1969).
193. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36,
342 A.2d 566 (1975).
194. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 788, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
197. See, e.g., Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978) (complaint attacking
short form merger for sole purpose of squeezing-out minority states cause of action); Lynch v.
Vickers, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977) (in tender offer, minority shareholders claimed they were co-
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Singer v. Magnavox Co.,198 the Delaware Supreme Court held that ma-
jority shareholders, who had effected a merger for the sole purpose of
squeezing-out the minority, had violated a fiduciary duty to protect the
minority shareholders' interest.199 The court asserted that such a
merger would be valid only when the majority shareholders demon-
strated: (1) a valid business purpose for the merger, and (2) that the
minority was treated fairly.2"° Although Tanzer v. International General
Industries, Inc. 201 modified the first prong of the Singer test2 2 by re-
quiring a "bona fide" rather than a "valid" business purpose,20 3 this
change has had little impact on the Delaware Supreme Court's willing-
ness to protect squeezed-out minority shareholders. 204  Following
Tanzer, the Delaware courts have continued to recognize a high stan-
dard of fiduciary duty in squeeze-out merger cases. 20 5
Although there has been an increase in the protection of minority
shareholders in both publicly-held and close corporations, 20 6 the trend
toward strict fiduciary duties will likely take hold more quickly in the
close corporation context. The relatively intimate relationship among
shareholders in the close corporation 20 7 and the reliance they place on
erced into selling their shares for a grossly inadequate price because of less than full disclosure,
held: fiduciary duty to minority includes complete candor); Young v. Valhi, 382 A.2d 1372 (Del.
Ch. 1978) (minority shareholder obtained injunction to stop merger involving formation of sub-
sidiary corporation and merger with subsidiary by majority vote, the basic purpose of which was
elimination of minority shareholders); Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977) (preliminary
injunction issued against short form merger because minority shareholder might persuade court
that he was treated unfairly). See also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer
v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
198. 380 A.2d 969 (DeL 1977).
199. Id. at 980.
200. Id.
201. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
202. For a discussion of the two-part Singer test, see Note, Singer v. Magnavox Co.: Delaware
Imposes Restrictions on Freeze-out Mergers, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 118 (1978); 31 VAND. L. REv. 183
(1977).
203. 379 A.2d at 1124.
204. In Note, supra note 202, the author asserts that although the Tanzer test is more lenient
than the Singer test, Tanzer is limited to situations where the majority shareholder is a business or
functioning enterprise. In the going private transaction, the interests of a separate functioning
enterprise are not at stake; therefore the Singer test would apply. Id. at 129.
205. See Najjar v. Roland Int'l. Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978); Young v. Vahli, 382
A.2d 1372 (Del Ch. 1978); Lynch v. Vickers, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977); Kemp v. Angel, 318 A.2d
241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
206. See notes 185-86 supra.
207. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 3.10.
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each others' capabilities2"8 should increase the willingness of courts to
protect minority shareholders.2 °' Further, the minority shareholder in
a close corporation, unlike his counterpart in a publicly-held corpora-
tion, does not have a ready market for his shares and may therefore be
locked into the enterprise.2"' Because the minority shareholder in a
close corporation cannot easily remedy his dissatisfaction with manage-
ment policy by selling his shares, he has a greater need for the protec-
tions of a higher fiduciary duty.2" I And finally, the principle of
majority rule has less validity in the close corporation where sharehold-
ers invest their money with the expectation of having a voice in all
business decisions. 212
It thus appears likely that increased protection for minority share-
holders will first solidify in the close corporation. 213 Further, a leading
commentator has predicted that the Donahue good faith and loyalty to
shareholders test will soon become the accepted standard of fiduciary
duty in the close corporation.2 14 This dramatic change at the state level
dictates a reevaluation of the use of rule lOb-5 in close corporations.
C. The Needjor Restricted Use of Rule 10b-5 in the Close
Corporation Context
Since close corporation shares are infrequently traded, the stock
transfers that have resulted in lawsuits usually have involved control-
208. See, e.g., Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 240 N.W.2d 507 (1976) (court
showed willingness to find a fiduciary relationship because of the corporate organizer's considera-
ble knowledge of corporate business and function and the reliance of another shareholder on the
organizer's expertise). See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 8.07.
209. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 1.07.
210. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
211. Note also that most close corporations, unlike publicly-held corporations, are not subject
to the registration requirements of § 5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)
(1976), and therefore this check on the excesses of majority shareholders is missing. Small corpo-
rations can avoid the registration requirements in a number of ways: (1) Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1978), provides an exemption from registration for
certain limited offers and sales of closely-held issuers; (2) an exemption for transactions "not in-
volving any public offering," 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1976); and (3) issues "offered and sold only to
persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a...
corporation, incorporated by or doing business within such State or Territory." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)
(11) (1976). See R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS-INCLUDING PART-
NERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 258 (1976).
212. See F. O'NE.AL, supra note 13, at § 9.04.
213. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 8.5.
214. See F. O'NE.AL, supra note 13, at iv-v (Supp. 1977).
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ling shareholders squeezing-out minority shareholders.215 The transac-
tion has more closely resembled a breach of fiduciary duty or corporate
mismanagement than a fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of a security.16 With the state courts adopting a higher fiduciary stan-
dard,217 it no longer seems wise to extend rule lb-5 to the private
transfers of close corporation securities. The serious disadvantages that
result from continued extension of rule lOb-5 far beyond its intended
context compel this conclusion.
First, the extension of rule lOb-5 to the close corporation, whose
shares are not traded in the securities market, has created an unneces-
sary intrusion by the federal government into state affairs. TheSupreme Court, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 218 has recently
regenerated the principle that the tenth amendment 219 restrains the fed-
eral government from usurping state power.2 ° In light of National
League of Cities, it is at least arguable by analogy that the application
of the federal securities laws to the close corporation, where the litiga-
tion more closely resembles state corporate mismanagement cases, rep-
resents an unnecessary federal intrusion on a state function.
Furthermore, the limitation of rule lOb-5 to publicly-held corpora-
tions would enable aggrieved minority shareholders in close corpora-
tions to obtain more effective remedies. As noted above,22' the federal
courts' broad reading of rule lOb-5 appears to have resulted in the fail-
ure of some state courts to develop a stringent fiduciary standard, leav-
ing the minority shareholder with only a federal remedy.222 And, in
215. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 1.07.
216. Professor O'Neal asserts: "A frequent grievance of minority shareholders or of former
minority shareholders who have sold their stock is that the majority shareholder or the corporate
managers depressed the value of the corporation's stock, typically by keeping dividends to a mini-
mum, in order to buy minority stock at a bargain price." F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 7.09. In
such a situation, it is difficult to determine whether the manipulation should fall under the head-
ing of corporate mismanagement or fraud "in connection with" a purchase or sale of a security.
Courts, however, have been able to circumvent consideration of this issue because of their broad
construction of the "in connection with" requirement. See notes 77-110 supra and accompanying
text.
217. See notes 183-84 supra and accompanying text.
218. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
219. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
220. 426 U.S. at 842.
221. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
222. See note 187 supra and accompanying text.
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many situations, this federal remedy has been inadequate.223
For example, if a plaintiff brought suit in federal court under rule
lOb-5, he could ordinarily224 recover only the difference between the
fair market value of the securities at the time of the fraudulent transfer
and the actual consideration paid.225 It is unlikely that the plaintiff
could recover consequential damages. Although the federal courts
have increasingly recognized a rule lOb-5 plaintiffs right to conse-
quential damages,226 the courts have usually required the plaintiff to
establish that the losses were caused by,227 or were a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of,228 the defendant's misrepresentations. But if
the same plaintiff had the option to sue in state court on a breach of
fiduciary duty claim, he could obtain a more complete remedy. With
such a claim, the plaintiff has the ability not only to recover punitive
damages,229 but also to impose liability on anyone who knowingly as-
sisted in the breach of duty.230 Furthermore, if the suit is derivative,
the corporation can recover its losses, compensation paid during the
period of the breach, and profits realized through the misappropriation
of corporate property.23' Thus, by restricting the use of rule lOb-5 in
close corporations and stimulating the state courts to develop higher
fiduciary duties, the minority shareholders could more readily obtain
effective remedies for their losses.232
223. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). See
also F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 7.13.
224. Courts, however, have developed many theories of recovery under rule lOb-5. See 5b A.
JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 60.03 (11-19 to 11-93).
225. See id. at § 260.03(c)(ii)(1 1-21). See also Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
226. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
781 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
227. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
228. See Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975). See
generally 5b A. JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 260.03(d) (11-94).
229. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 13, at § 8.13. Under rule lOb-5, however, a claimant cannot
obtain punitive damages. See 5b A. JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 260.03(e)(I 1-97).
230. Under rule lOb-5, a plaintiff, in a private damage action must show that the aider or
abettor had actual knowledge, not merely constructive knowledge of the fraudulent scheme. 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 97, at § 40.01 (2-109 to 2-110).
231. Id.
232. Although federal courts provide minority shareholders with certain procedural advan-
tages, see note 116 supra, these liberal service of process and venue provisions are less helpful in
the close corporation context because most close corporation shareholders are involved in the
activities of the business or live in the same locality. See 1 F. O'NEAx., supra note 11, at § 8.16.
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But most importantly, restricting the use of rule lOb-5 to publicly-
held corporations may reduce judicial vacillation.233 The application
of rule lOb-5 to close corporations, where lawsuits typically relate less
directly to the purchase or sale of a security,2 34 has been a major cause
of uncertainty over the rule's scope. Because there is no secondary
trading of securities, 235 the rule lOb-5 close corporation lawsuit is more
likely to contain corporate law issues. Some federal judges have been
reluctant to resolve these issues in the federal courts236 and conse-
quently courts have inconsistently interpreted the rule.2 37 But with the
state courts' trend toward a higher fiduciary duty,238 the application of
rule lOb-5 to close corporation mismanagement suits is no longer nec-
essary. If courts adopt this proposal, the result will be greater certainty
over the ambit of rule lOb-5.
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to limit rule lOb-5 by distin-
guishing the close corporation, the restrictive trend is a positive change
in the direction of corporate law. Although one may favor increased
federal regulation of corporations,239 such a marked change in the allo-
cation of government powers should be left to the legislature, which
can more effectively balance the numerous and competing social inter-
ests implicated.24° The result of continuing to extend rule lOb-5
through judicial mandate into the field of corporate fiduciary duty and
corporate mismanagement will be further fluctuations, inconsistencies,
and uncertainty. This can only create instability in the securities mar-
233. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
234. See F. O'NEA., supra note 13, at iv-v (Supp. 1977).
235. See I F. O'NEM., supra note I1, at § 1.07.
236. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
237. See note 37 supra.
238. See notes 183-84 supra and accompanying text.
239. See note 126 supra. See also R. NADER, M. GREEN, & E. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL-
IZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS
(1976); Henning, Federal Corporate Charleringfor Big Business:.An Idea Whose Time Has Come?,
21 DE PAUL L. REv. 915 (1972); Schwartz, supra note 121; Comment, 117 U. PA L. REV. 861
(1969).
240. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977). The Court noted that
"[tihere may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that
challenged in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.' " Id.
Even Professor Cary, who has vigorously argued for comprehensive federal fiduciary standards,
urges a frontal attack with a new federal statute rather than an extension of rule lOb-5. "It seems
anomalous to jigsaw every kind of corporate dispute into the federal courts through the securities
acts as they are now written." Cary, supra note 115, at 700.
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kets and stifle the effectiveness of rule lOb-5 and the federal securities
laws.
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